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George Berkeley (1685-1753)
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George Berkeley, born in 1685 at Dysart Castle
in County Kilkenny, and Bishop of Cloyne from
1734 to 1753, wrote a philosophical analysis of
materialism which has been the subject of
controversy since its publication.
Berkeley attacked the belief in material
objects that underlay the prevailing scientific
model of the world. He argued that there was
no basis for a belief in physical objects or an
external world, and that we should think of all
objects as being mental.
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses,
mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence,
natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But
with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be
entertained in the world; yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in
question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction.
For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by
sense? And what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations; and is it
not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them
should exist unperceived? *
Modern philosophers have tended to marginalise Berkeley because his views
appear to be radically at odds with the conventional scientific worldview.
Bertrand Russell, for example, took Berkeley’s arguments seriously but felt
justified in dismissing them.
In one sense it must be admitted that we can never prove the existence of
things other than ourselves and our experiences. No logical absurdity results
from the hypothesis that the world consists of myself and my thoughts and
feelings and sensations, and that everything else is mere fancy. [...] There is
no logical impossibility in the supposition that the whole of life is a dream, in
which we ourselves create all the objects that come before us. But although
this is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose that it
is true; and it is, in fact, a less simple hypothesis, viewed as a means of
accounting for the facts of our own life, than the common-sense hypothesis
that there really are objects independent of us, whose action on us causes
our sensations.
The way in which simplicity comes in from supposing that there really are
physical objects is easily seen. If the cat appears at one moment in one part
of the room, and at another in another part, it is natural to suppose that it
has moved from the one to the other, passing over a series of intermediate
positions. But if it is merely a set of sense-data, it cannot have ever been in
any place where I did not see it; thus we shall have to suppose that it did not
exist at all while I was not looking, but suddenly sprang into being in a new
place. **
In these extracts from his book
The Problems of Philosophy, Russell mentions
some of the apparent problems of Berkeley’s thesis. It seems natural to one
to suppose that, during the time between seeing the cat the first time and seeing
it the second time, something exists which one can label as ‘the cat’, even if
no one is having sensory experiences involving this inferred cat. However, the
fact that positing such an independent entity may seem natural, or
convenient, does not constitute philosophical proof.
* George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, in A.J. Ayer
& R. Winch (Eds.), British Empirical Philosophers, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1952, p.179.
** Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Williams & Norgate 1912, pp.30-36.